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FAIR HOUSING ISSUES IN CONTINUING CARE
RETIREMENT COMMUNITIES: CAN RESIDENTS
BE TRANSFERRED WITHOUT
THEIR CONSENT?
Lauren R. Sturm*
Consider the following detailed hypothetical scenario:  An eld-
erly and quadriplegic resident in the independent living housing
section of a continuing care retirement community (CCRC) wishes
to continue to live independently in her current apartment, with
the assistance of privately paid outside home health aides.  In addi-
tion to housing, the CCRC provides her with meals, housekeeping
and other non-skilled services.  When she moved into her unit 15
years ago, she had signed a contract that stated she may be moved
to the skilled nursing facility part of the CCRC if the current hous-
ing providers, who own both the independent living facility and
the skilled nursing facility, determined they are no longer in a posi-
tion to meet the resident’s physical and/or emotional needs.  Now
they want to move this resident to the skilled nursing facility, citing
deterioration in her physical capacity. Other than growing older,
there has been no appreciable change in her condition.  As some-
one who has lived with quadriplegia since 1948 (she was in a seri-
ous car accident), she is knowledgeable about her disability and
how to live with it.  The resident is intelligent and well spoken, but
has disagreed with staff before, and rarely interacts with the other
residents socially.  If she was moved to the skilled nursing facility,
she would still be paying the CCRC, and another individual could
occupy the independent living unit at a higher price than the one
agreed on 15 years ago when she moved in.
The resident can pursue the matter through a federal fair
housing complaint, but the situation has few precedents and many
legal questions.  Would requesting an exception to this contract
provision be a “reasonable accommodation” under the Fair Hous-
ing Act?  Could the contract be declared invalid if it was shown to
be against the Fair Housing Act or a comparable state statute, and
what impact would that have?  Should CCRCs be handled differ-
ently than other “dwellings”?
* Candidate for J.D., elder law certificate, University of Kansas Law School, May
2004.  She is the second-place winner of the ABA/FJC Law and Aging Student Essay
Competition, Sid Kess Award.
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I. THE FAIR HOUSING ACT/AMENDMENTS OF 1988
The Fair Housing Act (FHA) authorizes individuals who be-
lieve they are being discriminated against in a housing practice to
file a complaint with the department of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment (HUD) and pursue that complaint through the legal sys-
tem.1 When the original 1968 Fair Housing Act was passed, bases of
discrimination included race, color, religion and national origin.2
Sex was included in 1974,3 and handicap and familial status was
added in the 1988 Fair Housing Amendments Act (FHAA).4
The Fair Housing Act only applies to those properties that can
be designated as “dwellings,” that is, “any building, structure, or
portion thereof which is occupied as, or designed or intended for
occupancy as, a residence by one or more families, and any vacant
land which is offered for sale or lease for the construction or loca-
tion thereon of any such building, structure or portion thereof.”5
This could include houses, apartments, manufactured housing,
condominiums, cooperatives, and time-sharing properties.6
According to the FHA, any aggrieved person, or HUD itself,
can file a complaint up to one year after an alleged FHA violation
has occurred.7  Within 100 days of this filing, HUD must investigate
any case not handled by a substantially similar state agency to de-
termine whether “reasonable cause” exists to think that an FHA
violation has occurred.8  Simultaneously, HUD must also engage
the complainant and respondent in a conciliation process, but set-
tling a complaint through HUD conciliation is not mandatory.9  If
a “reasonable cause” determination is made, and no settlement has
been reached, HUD will issue a formal charge on behalf of the
complainant.10  The case may then go to a federal district court
where the U.S. Department of Justice would represent the govern-
ment and the complainant to the extent that the government and
1 42 U.S.C. § 361 et seq. (1994).
2 Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 810(a), 82 Stat. 73, 85-86
(1968).
3 Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383,
§ 109(a), 88 Stat. 633, 649 (1974) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5301 (2003)).
4 Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 6(b), 102 Stat. 1619, 1622 (1988) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604, 3606 (2003)).
5 42 U.S.C. § 3602(b) (1989).
6 ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGATION § 9:2
(2001).
7 42 U.S.C. § 3610 (a)(1)(A)(i).
8 Id. § 3610(a)(1)(B)(iv), (g)(1).
9 Id. § 3610(b).
10 Id. § 3610(g)(2)(A).
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complainant’s interests are the same, or be tried before a HUD-
appointed administrative law judge (ALJ) no later than 120 days
after the charge is filed.11  The complainant may also choose to
engage in a private lawsuit.12   The ALJ is required to decide the
case within 60 days after the hearing and may award actual dam-
ages, injunctive relief, civil penalties of up to $50,000, and attor-
ney’s fees.13  ALJ decisions are subject to review by the secretary of
HUD and the courts.14
Recognizing the need for special housing to accommodate the
older U.S. population, Congress exempted housing for older per-
sons from the FHA’s prohibition from discrimination based on fa-
milial status only.15  Any other type of discrimination or any other
practice that would facilitate discrimination that is not based on
familial status, such as inaccessible dwellings, would be actionable
under the FHA.
Additionally, the 1988 FHAA description of a “handicap” as
being a “physical or mental impairment, which substantially limits
one or more of a person’s major life activities” also describes many
of the physical problems associated with old age.16  Being elderly
does not in and of itself constitute a handicap. However, it is im-
portant to realize that many elderly individuals fall into a protected
class, and therefore have certain rights under the FHA that will be
discussed subsequently in this article as they relate to transfer poli-
cies in CCRCs. For example, this designation is important when
one considers the issue of what inquiries a housing provider can
make regarding a housing applicant or resident.
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 197317 provided the
definition of a disability that is used in the Fair Housing Act.  This
Act applied the same antidiscrimination precepts to any “program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any pro-
gram or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the
United States Postal Service.”18  This Act provided fair housing pro-
tection to federally assisted housing before the Fair Housing Act
absorbed that function.  Additionally, the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act (ADA) extended this protection to any programs, activities
11 Id. § 3610(a), (b), (d), § 3612(g), (o).
12 Id. § 3613.
13 Id. § 3612(g), (p).
14 Id. § 3612(h)-(i).
15 Id. § 3607(b)(2)-(3).
16 Id.  § 3602(h).
17 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2003).
18 Id.
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and services of state and local government entities.19  Although the
FHA and ADA overlap, the ADA fills a gap in the FHA by covering
“public accommodations” such as sales or home rental offices.20
Court decisions have extended FHA protection to assisted liv-
ing facilities and skilled nursing homes.21  Furthermore, in a sup-
plemental discussion on accessibility regulations by HUD, CCRCs
can be protected as dwellings under the FHA, as long as the facility
includes at least one building consisting of four or more dwelling
units.22  The Act defines “dwelling” as a facility used as a residence
for more than a brief period of time.23 Because of the subjectivity
of this criteria, each continuing care facility must be examined on
a case-by-case basis using the factors set by HUD, including, but not
limited to: “(1) the length of time persons stay in the project; (2)
whether policies are in effect at the project that are designed and
intended to encourage or discourage occupants from forming an
expectation and intent to continue to occupy space at the project;
and (3) the nature of the services provided by or at the project.”24
II. CONTINUING CARE RETIREMENT COMMUNITIES (CCRCS)
The American Association of Homes and Services for the Ag-
ing (AAHSA) defines a CCRC as “an organization that offers a full
range of housing, residential services, and health care in order to
service its older residents as their needs change over time.”25  The
three main stages of care provided in a CCRC are independent
living units (modified apartments or homes), assisted living facili-
ties (assistance to residents short of 24-hour skilled nursing care),
and skilled nursing care facilities (nursing homes).26  It is possible
for residents to make temporary or permanent movements within
these levels depending on their medical needs.27 CCRCs can be
owned and operated by for-profit or not-for-profit organizations,
19 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000).
20 Wai v. Allstate Ins. Co., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8-11 (D.D.C. 1999).
21 See generally United States v. Lorantffy Care Center, 999 F. Supp. 1037 (N.D. Ohio
1998); United States v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 764 F. Supp. 220 (D.P.R. 1991).
22 Supplement to Notice of Fair Housing Accessibility Guidelines: Questions and Answers
About the Guidelines, 59 Fed. Reg. 33364 (June 28, 1994) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R.
ch. 1).
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Jacquelyn Sanders, Continuing Care Retirement Communities: A Background and
Summary of Current Issues, U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services (Feb. 24, 1997),
available at http://aspe.os.dhhs.gov/daltcp/Reports/ccrcrpt.htm.
26 Id.
27 Id.
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and payment to a CCRC depends on the type of contract a resident
chooses.
In 2003, it was estimated that there were approximately 2,150
CCRCs with about 613,625 beds.28  The broader category of “se-
niors housing with relatively generous wellness and support ser-
vices” attracts people over age 75.29  Before allowing a senior
citizen to reside in a CCRC, admission criteria often are assessed,
which mainly revolve around financial capability and medical
health.30 A study from 1988 found that CCRCs rejected 50% of ap-
plicants for health reasons and 39% for financial reasons.31  CCRCs
assess a potential resident’s physical and mental capacity, both in
the initial application process and as the resident continues to live
in the independent living unit, to determine his or her ability to
live independently.32
Twenty-five states have some form of regulation for CCRCs.33
These regulations tend to focus on the financial solvency of the
CCRC, and rules for disclosures and contracts for the consumer.34
A few states have gone further in creating CCRC regulations that
more comprehensively protect consumers; one such statutory
scheme will be discussed later in this article.
More commonly, states will license and regulate the skilled
nursing facility and the assisted living facility within a CCRC, but
not the independent living units.  The Omnibus Budget Reconcili-
ation Act of 1987 (OBRA) federally regulates nursing homes.35
28 EVELYN HOWARD ET. AL., HDR AFFORDABLE SENIORS HOUSING HANDBOOK § 2:10
(2003).
29 Id. at § 2:30.
30 AARP, Continuing Care Retirement Communities (CCRCs) (2004), at http://www.
aarp.org/confacts/housing/ccrc.html (on file with the New York City Law Review).
31 Frank A. Sloan et. al., Continuous Care Retirement Communities: Prospects for Reduc-
ing Institutional Long-Term Care, 20 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & LAW 75, 86 (1995).
32 AARP, supra note 30.
33 ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-93-101 (Michie 2001); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1770
(West 2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN § 17b-520 (West 2003); DEL. CODE ANN. 18
§ 4601 (2003); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 651.011 (2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-45-1 (2002);
IDAHO CODE § 67-2750 (Michie 2003); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-4-1 (Michie 2003); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 523D.1 (West 2003); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:2171 (West 2003); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. 24-A § 6201 (West 2003); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 93 § 76 (West 2003);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80D.01.20 (West 2003); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 420-D:1 (2002);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D (West 2003); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-17-1 (Michie 2003); N.Y.
PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4601 (McKinney 2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-64-1 (2003); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. 63 § 1-1921 (West 2003); 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3201 (West 2003); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 23-59-1 (2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-11-10 (2002); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE ANN. § 246.001 (Vernon 2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-4900 (Michie 2003); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 647.01 (West 2003).
34 See id.
35 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395i-3 (2003).
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Each skilled nursing facility is licensed in the state in which it oper-
ates. Facilities that receive federal funds through Medicare and
Medicaid must comply with OBRA through audits and yearly in-
spections.36  OBRA is a minimal standard, and not intended to
limit other state and federal laws or regulations.37  As of 1998, 22
states regulated assisted living facilities.38  Because independent liv-
ing facilities are not allowed to provide skilled nursing care, they
are more likely to be regulated as any multifamily dwelling would
be in that state.  In the hypothetical, the State of Iowa clarified that
only providing skilled nursing care in the independent living units
could cause the CCRC to lose its state license for the skilled nurs-
ing facility.39
Some self-regulation of CCRCs does exist.  The Continuing
Care Accreditation Commission (CCAC) is a private entity that ac-
credits and evaluates CCRCs on a voluntary basis.40  According to
the CCAC Handbook, “[t]he CCAC standards have three major
purposes, which are to assist a CCRC in developing, interpreting,
improving and evaluating all components of its operation, to pro-
vide the basis for accreditation decisions and to assure consumers
that the CCRC has met pre-determined standards.”41  In the most
recent edition of the CCAC accreditation standards, the organiza-
tion promulgated guidelines on care coordination within the con-
tinuum.42 The organization has written guidelines for the transfer
decision-making process and the consideration used in admission
to each level of care.43 The decision to transfer a resident within
the continuum is made through a clearly defined process involving
the resident, appropriate staff members and, as necessary, the resi-
dent’s representative.44  The guidelines are reviewed regularly with
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Jeremy Citro & Sharon Hermanson, Assisted Living in the United States, AARP
Public Policy Institute (Mar. 1999), available at http://research.aarp.org/il/fs62r_as-
sisted.html.
39 Interview with Debi Myers, Ombudsman, State of Iowa Office of Elder Affairs
(July 9, 2002).
40 See generally THE CONTINUING CARE ACCREDITATION COMMISSION, at http://www.
ccaconline.org.
41 Sanders, supra note 25 (citing CONTINUING CARE ACCREDITATION COMMISSION,
HANDBOOK FOR CANDIDATE CCRCS, at http://www.ccaconline.org/Downloads/docu-
ment/handbook.pdf (on file with the New York City Law Review).
42 THE CONTINUING CARE ACCREDITATION COMMISSION, STANDARDS OF EXCELLENCE
REQUIRED DOCUMENTS SELF-ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS, 25 (2002), at http://www.ccacon-
line.org/Downloads/StandardsAugust2002.htm (on file with the New York City Law
Review).
43 Id.
44 Id.
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residents.45  Unfortunately, no example of an appropriate process
was listed in the CCAC.46  As of 1997, only 207 CCRCs have main-
tained CCAC accreditation.47  The CCRC in the hypothetical was
not accredited by the CCAC.
CCRC contracts fall into three categories: extensive, modified,
and fee-for-service agreements.48  An extensive agreement, some-
times referred to as a “life care” agreement, includes housing, resi-
dential services and amenities, pre-payment of medical expenses
and unlimited long-term care without substantial increases in peri-
odic payments.  This type of agreement carries the greatest finan-
cial risk for CCRCs.49 The modified agreement also covers housing,
residential services and amenities and limited nursing care without
any substantial increases in periodic payments.  The main differ-
ence between this and the extensive agreement is that here, care is
paid for a specific number of days each year, and any care beyond
this is paid by the resident through a daily charge.   In this way, the
CCRC’s financial risk is mitigated.50  The fee-for-service agreement
includes housing, residential services, and amenities.  Health care
is guaranteed on-site, but payment is out-of-pocket, with the resi-
dent bearing responsibility for obtaining third-party (Medicare/
Medicaid) reimbursement.  Here, the CCRC bears no financial
risk, and therefore, fees are generally lower.51
What sets CCRCs apart from other housing arrangements for
older Americans is that they have more than one housing type
available to a resident based on their medical needs.52  This allows
the resident to “age in place,” rather than being uprooted from a
community due to an increased need for skilled care.  Conse-
quently, the CCRC must work with the resident, his or her family,
or other parties to determine the criteria that govern the resident’s
move among the different housing models to accommodate the
needs of the resident. With this type of arrangement, the CCRC
management avoids dictating such a change, which could alienate
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Sanders, supra note 25 (citations omitted).
48 Id. (citing UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRES-
SIONAL REQUESTERS, HEALTH CARE SERVICES: HOW CONTINUING CARE RETIREMENT COM-
MUNITIES MANAGE SERVICES FOR THE ELDERLY, GAO/HEHS-97-36 (Jan. 1997), available
at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/he90736.pdf (citing letter from William J.
Scanlon).
49 See generally UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Sanders, supra note 25.
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residents and their families and friends, infringe upon the spirit of
the CCRC model, and potentially, violate federal law.
III. FAIR HOUSING ISSUES PRESENT IN THIS HYPOTHETICAL
The CCRC’s actions in the hypothetical may violate two provi-
sions of the Fair Housing Act: § 3604(f)(2)(A), which states, “dis-
criminating against any person in the terms, conditions, or
privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of ser-
vices or facilities in connection with such dwelling, because of a
handicap of that person;” and § 3604(f)(3)(B), which states, “a re-
fusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, prac-
tices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to
afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwell-
ing.”53  A possible affirmative defense for respondents would be
§ 3604(f)(9), which states that, “[n]othing . . . requires that a
dwelling be made available to an individual whose tenancy would
constitute a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals
or whose tenancy would result in substantial physical damage to
the property of others.”54
A. Applicant Selection Inquiries in CCRCs
Correlating with the Fair Housing Act’s prohibition on dis-
criminating against the handicapped, § 100.202(c) of the accompa-
nying HUD regulations states that:
[i]t shall be unlawful to make an inquiry to determine whether
an applicant for a dwelling, a person intending to reside in that
dwelling after it is so sold, rented or made available, or any per-
son associated with that person, has a handicap or to make in-
quiry as to the nature or severity of a handicap of such a
person.55
Case law shows this includes questions regarding a person’s
ability to live unassisted or what assistance may be required regard-
ing hygiene or other personal needs.56  One might argue that by
logical extension, any determination by a housing provider that the
person cannot live independently based on these illegal inquiries is
also illegal.  One case that supports this position is Cason v. Roches-
53 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (f)(2)(A), (f)(3)(B) (2001).
54 Id. § 3604 (f)(9).
55 24 C.F.R. § 100.202(c) (2003).
56 See Niederhauser v. Independence Square Housing, [1998 Transfer Binder] Fair
Housing-Fair Lending Rep. ¶16,305, at 16,305.7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 1998); Campbell v.
Minneapolis Pub. Hous. Auth., 168 F.3d 1069, 1074-75 (8th Cir. 1999).
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ter Housing Authority.57  There, the defendants required that hous-
ing applicants demonstrate the ability to live independently before
a unit was granted.58  The plaintiff in this case was denied a hous-
ing unit because she needed a wheelchair and walker, used aide
services, and relied on adult diapers.59 The court ruled that even
though having an independent living requirement for the housing
unit did not substantially cause discrimination against the disabled
(it only affected 17 out of 276 disabled applicants), the policy nega-
tively impacts only the disabled, and therefore is illegal under the
Fair Housing Act.60  Questions that could be asked to all applicants
on a nondiscriminatory basis might include income, references,
and rental history, as well as questions regarding age or handicap
when you have to be a certain age or have a handicap to qualify for
the housing.  But discriminatory questions are not permitted.61
Niederhauser v. Independence Square Housing extended the regu-
lation to cover existing tenants, even when the policy is expressly
spelled out in the rental agreement.62  Plaintiffs were an elderly
and disabled married couple who had lived in a housing unit
owned by defendants (“ISH”) since 1979.63  In 1985, ISH issued
new “Qualifications for Tenancy” with the renewal of plaintiff’s
lease, which required that all tenants be capable of living indepen-
dently.64 In 1996, ISH questioned plaintiffs’ ability to meet the new
tenancy requirements after Mr. Niederhauser was released from
the hospital.65  ISH then stated that Mr. Niederhauser would not
be accepted back and that the couple should seek another resi-
dence.66  The court ruled that ISH’s policy and actions were illegal,
stating that any policy that asks an applicant or a current tenant a
question beyond what would be asked to determine housing eligi-
bility in terms of their disability or their ability to live indepen-
dently, is illegal, and any policy that would evict a tenant based on
such inquiries is also illegal.67
More recently, a consent order was issued against a retirement
57 748 F. Supp. 1002, 1008-09 (W.D.N.Y. 1990).
58 Id. at 1004.
59 Id. at 1005.
60 Id. at 1009.
61 24 C.F.R. § 100.202(c) (2003).
62 Niederhauser, [1998 Transfer Binder] Fair Housing-Fair Lending Rep. at
¶ 16,305.7.
63 Id. at ¶ 16,305.1.
64 Id. at ¶ 16,305.2.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
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community because of inquiries it made into the medical condi-
tion of individuals seeking admission.68  In that case, the defendant
retirement community was ordered, among other things, to pay
civil penalties and to provide documentation of its admission prac-
tices.69  The case does not indicate whether or not the defendant
was organized in the manner of a CCRC.
As shown above, the illegal inquiry provision could be prob-
lematic for senior citizen housing that provides health and other
services, such as CCRCs.  Questions about applicants’ ability to live
independently, beyond just their age, are asked by administrators
at these facilities so as to better meet residents’ needs, which, in the
case of CCRCs, might mean possible transfer to a different housing
model on the CCRC campus.  However, such questions in the ini-
tial application process would not be allowed, as these facilities are
subject to the Fair Housing Act.70 In the hypothetical, the com-
plainant was asked numerous questions about her health and inde-
pendent living status throughout her residency in the CCRC,
including questions about the severity of her disability, her ability
to go to the bathroom unassisted and her mental fitness.  These
questions, the staff’s subsequent records about the complainant
and the final determination to transfer her would be illegal under
Niederhauser and Resurrection.
If a court were to adopt the theory in Niederhauser and Resurrec-
tion, the whole CCRC model might be called into question.  CCRCs
provide a “continuum of care,” that is, a range of services, skilled
caregivers, and housing options packaged in discrete categories of
living arrangements on one campus.  In order to do this effectively,
the CCRC needs information about how a resident functions or
whether there has been any change in his or her status.   If a CCRC
cannot pursue inquiries and make determinations about a person’s
ability to live independently, then it cannot effectively provide a
continuum of care.
B. Reasonable Accommodations Under the Fair Housing Act
Alternatively, the complainant can invoke a theory pursuant to
§ 804(f)(3)(B), whereby a reasonable accommodation must be
made so that the person could remain in the unit and argue that
68 United States v. Resurrection Retirement Community, Inc., et al., (N.D. Ill. Oct. 22,
2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/housing/documents/resurrectsettle.
htm.
69 Id.
70 United States v. Lorantffy Care Ctr., 999 F. Supp. 1037, 1043-44 (N.D. Ohio 1998).
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“reasonable accommodations” must be made in “rules, policies or
services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford a
handicapped person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwell-
ing.”71  The accommodation must be made unless it imposes an
undue financial or administrative burden on a defendant or re-
quires a fundamental alteration in the nature of its program.72
“Reasonableness” is the first element of a prima facie reasonable
accommodation case, and although some cases put the burden of
proving the reasonableness requirement on the plaintiff,73 others
put the burden on the defendant.74  A plaintiff should also show
that he or she suffers from a handicap as defined in § 3602(h), that
the defendant knew or should have known about this handicap,
that the accommodation of the handicap may be necessary to af-
ford the plaintiff an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the hous-
ing involved, and that the defendant refused to make such an
accommodation.75  Absent federal law, many of these reasonable
accommodations would violate the housing policies that are
spelled out in the rental contract.  Examples include allowing a
blind tenant to have a seeing eye dog, despite a “no pets” policy,76
reserving more accessible parking spaces for mobility-impaired te-
nants, despite a “first-come, first-served” parking policy,77 letting
nontenants help tenants by using housing facilities when they oth-
erwise would not be allowed to do so,78 and allowing the tenant to
pay for accessibility ramps when other such alterations would not
be permitted.79
Are the prima facie elements of a good reasonable accommo-
dation case satisfied in the hypothetical?  The complainant has a
handicap as defined by the FHA and applicable case law.  The re-
spondent knew of the disability and it kept medical records on the
complainant’s condition.  While the respondent had provided ac-
71 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (2001).
72 See generally HUD v. Ocean Sands, Inc., [1994-2003 Transfer Binder] Fair Housing-
Fair Lending Rep. ¶ 25,056 (HUD Secretary Oct. 4, 1993).
73 See, e.g., Elderhaven, Inc. v. City of Lubbock, 98 F.3d 175, 178 (5th Cir. 1996).
74 See, e.g., Keys Youth Servs. v. City of Olathe, 52 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1304 (D. Kan.
1999) (citing Hovsons, Inc. v. Township of Brick, 89 F.3d 1096, 1103 (3d Cir. 1996)).
75 See generally Ocean Sands  [1994-2003 Transfer Binder] Fair Housing-Fair Lend-
ing Rep. at ¶ 25,550.
76 24 C.F.R. § 100.204(b): Example (1); Bronk v. Ineichen, 54 F.3d 425, 429 (7th Cir.
1995).
77 24 C.F.R. § 100.204(b): Example (2); Shapiro v. Cadman Towers, Inc., 51 F.3d 328,
333-336 (2d Cir. 1995).
78 Implementation of the Fair Housing Authority Act, 54 Fed. Reg. 3232, 3248
(Jan. 23, 1989).
79 Hunter v. Trenton Hous. Auth., 698 A.2d 25, 26 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997).
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commodations for her disability in the past, it refused to provide
the most recently requested accommodation.   The latter accom-
modation is necessary to afford the complainant an equal opportu-
nity to use and enjoy the housing involved, as the alternative would
be to live in a skilled nursing facility that would not furnish her
with the privacy or accoutrements of an independent living unit.
Additionally, the institutional environment would give her little
control over her living environment, and might affect her overall
health due to the nature of her quadriplegia.  Because of her disa-
bility, the complainant has a weakened immune system that causes
her condition to be aggravated by small changes in the tempera-
ture, or by use of the wrong supplies.
The final question concerns the reasonableness of the accom-
modation. The complainant is asking for more than just an assist-
and-comfort animal or a closer parking space.  Rather, she is asking
for an exception to the contract she signed, so that she can remain
in her unit even though the CCRC would otherwise have the right
to ask her to leave or to transfer her to the skilled nursing facility.
The respondent could argue that in exchange for life-long care,
certain rights have to be handed over to the facility.  In this juris-
diction, however, the state does not require the CCRC to offer an
intermediate living choice like assisted-living. Because the CCRC
does not have such an intermediate option, the transfer would
cause a harsher change in lifestyle.
Nonetheless, considering the damage that would be done to
complainant’s quality of life, to her ability to care for herself with
the assistance of privately paid aides, and to the stable condition
she maintained during her prior residency, it is doubtful that the
CCRC’s decision was based on sound medical principles. Although
the language in the contract would indicate that the respondent
has a right to disagree with medical opinion, doing so in the face of
complainant’s request for an exception seems unreasonable with-
out some other explanation.
While precedents are few, case law indicates that the com-
plainant asked for a reasonable accommodation.80  In Janniney v.
Maximum Independent Living, the magistrate judge ruled that evict-
ing a mobility-disabled person who provided his own services to
80 In O’Neal  v. Ala. Dept. of Pub. Health, 826 F. Supp. 1368 (M.D. Ala. 1993), an
assisted-living facility was allowed to refuse to allow residents with Alzheimer’s disease
to remain in its facility because doing so would cause it to lose its state license.  This
case is distinguishable on its facts because in the hypothetical, any care that is beyond
the facility’s mandate is provided by privately paid aides, not the facility’s staff. There-
fore, the skilled nursing care center’s license would not be in jeopardy.
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support his independent living was a violation of the FHAA, and
called the respondent’s policy, “at best a paternalistic attempt to
direct these individuals to more suitable housing and at worst, prej-
udicial discrimination.”81 The precedents of this case and the Nie-
derhauser case, indicate that allowing the complainant to remain
would be a reasonable accommodation of her disability, unless the
respondent demonstrated that a severe financial cost would result
from the accommodation.
It might be difficult to perceive the difference between the two
theories that are cited here as a basis for the complainant’s case
because they both result from the same basic facts.  Nevertheless,
from the CCRC’s point of view, the complainant’s success under a
reasonable accommodation theory is preferable, as the lesser of
two evils, to success under an illegal inquiry theory. If the com-
plainant wins under a reasonable accommodation theory, the
CCRC can continue to gather information about a resident and to
evaluate his or her ability to live independently.  Transfers can be
viewed on a case-by-case basis, giving the CCRC the opportunity to
communicate with the resident, with her doctor, or with any other
appropriate party in a way that maintains a good relationship be-
tween the facility and its residents.
If the illegal inquiry theory were to be adopted by the court,
CCRCs would have to completely reevaluate their entire residency
policy, which could lead to negative financial results, or could
tempt them to use other legal residency requirements as a pretext
for excluding the “nonyouthful elderly.”  This unintended conse-
quence is especially troubling because it would create additional
fair housing litigation, while withholding appropriate housing
from those who need it the most.  HUD needs to provide more
regulatory guidance on applying fair housing regulations to facili-
ties that furnish housing and services to senior citizens, including
CCRCs, independent living facilities, assisted living facilities and
skilled nursing facilities.
C. The Health and Safety Exception
As an affirmative defense, the respondents could argue that
under § 3604(f)(9), the tenancy would constitute a direct threat to
the health or safety of other individuals or that it would result in
substantial physical damage to the property of others.82  Because of
the immobility of the complainant, and the fact that the facility
81 No. 00-0879, slip op. at *15-16 (N.D. Ohio filed Feb. 9, 2001).
82 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(9) (2001); 24 C.F.R. § 100.202(d) (2003).
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does not provide 24-hour skilled-nursing care, egress in the event
of an emergency could be very difficult, endangering the com-
plainant, other residents, staff, and rescue personnel.  The Fair
Housing Act permits reasonable restrictions on the terms and con-
ditions of housing, even the denial of housing, if justified by public
safety concerns.83  It also permits any state or local safety ordinance
that appears to impose standards that are different from those to
which it subjects the general population, so long as that protection
is demonstrated to be warranted by unique and specific needs and
abilities of those handicapped persons.84  However, in this case, no
state or local ordinance was a factor in the decision to transfer the
complainant, and there was no evidence that the person presented
an egress risk because no records were kept from any fire or emer-
gency drills on how long it took the individual to exit the facility.
In the House Report on the Fair Housing Amendments Act of
1988, the following was stated regarding this exception: “[a]ny
claim that an individual’s tenancy poses a direct threat and a sub-
stantial risk of harm must be established on the basis of a history of
overt acts or current conduct.  Generalized assumption, subjective
fears and speculation are insufficient to prove the requisite direct
threat to others.”85  Therefore, unless additional evidence of a
health or safety risk is discovered, the complainant’s right to use
and enjoy her housing would outweigh any slight and unassessed
health or safety risk to others.  However, if such evidence could be
provided, the CCRC would have a viable defense to complainant’s
FHA complaint.
IV. RECOMMENDATION REGARDING CCRC TRANSFERS:
THE MAINE MODEL
The best alternative to protracted legal battles and unin-
tended consequences resulting from the court’s interpretation of
federal law is a proactive legal model that spells out the responsibil-
ities of the CCRC to the resident whenever a transfer is considered.
The Continuing Care Accreditation Commission’s (CCAC) stan-
dard for transfer policies86 recognizes the importance of a coopera-
83 Bangerter v. Orem City Corp., 46 F.3d 1491, 1503 (10th Cir. 1995).
84 Marbrunak, Inc. v. City of Stow, 974 F.2d 43, 47 (6th Cir. 1992) (citations
omitted).
85 H.R. REP. NO. 100-711, at 29 (1988) (citations omitted).
86 THE CONTINUING CARE ACCREDITATION COMMISSION STANDARDS OF EXCELLENCE
REQUIRED DOCUMENTS SELF-ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS 20-26 (2002), at http://www.
ccaconline.org/Downloads/StandardsAugust2002.htm (on file with the New York
City Law Review).
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tive transfer process, but since CCAC accreditation is voluntary,
federal or state law must fill the void so that the interests of re-
sidents and facilities are properly balanced and responsibilities are
clearly defined.  The State of Maine provides the best legislative
model for other states.  Regarding the transfer of CCRC residents,
the Maine Insurance Code provides:
A resident of a continuing care retirement community may
be transferred to a residential care unit or a bed within the
skilled nursing facility under the following conditions:
1. Written Consent:  With the written consent of the resident or
the resident’s authorized representative; or
2. Health or Safety Danger:  Upon a finding that the resident
poses a health or safety danger to other residents or a change
in a resident’s health status or abilities necessitates a move to
a higher level of care.  A decision to transfer or change a resi-
dent’s accommodations may be made only after extended
consultation between the provider’s interdisciplinary team,
including, but not limited to, medical personnel, social work-
ers and therapists of the community, and the resident, the
resident’s treating physician and the resident’s family or
other representative.  The decision may also consider all rea-
sonable care alternatives.  A written decision to transfer or
change a resident’s accommodations must describe why the
resident’s health care needs cannot be met at the resident’s
present location.  The resident may appeal this determina-
tion to the department pursuant to rules proscribed by the
department.87
This statute spells out many important elements for an effec-
tive CCRC transfer policy.  First, it limits the reasons a CCRC can
transfer a resident with the resident’s consent or when the resident
poses a health and safety danger.  Other factors, such as how the
resident gets along with staff or how he or she interacts with other
residents, are not allowed to be considered.  Second, it requires
that the facility have individuals other than the facility’s manage-
ment participate in the decision-making process.  This allows doc-
tors, therapists, and social workers — who must work with the
resident, resident’s family, and any authorized representative — to
participate in the decision-making process. These safeguards en-
sure that qualified individuals are assessing the resident’s health
and well-being with the full participation of the resident and his or
her loved ones or advocates.  Third, it requires a detailed, written
explanation for the facility’s decision.   Lastly, and perhaps most
87 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 24-A § 6228 (1964).
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importantly, it provides an appeals process for the resident.  This
law is comprehensive, simple and direct.  No other state has such a
law, although many states, including New York, New Jersey, and
California, require detailed disclosures of a facility’s transfer pol-
icy.88 Federal adoption of the Maine statute would decrease the
chance that CCRC residents would need current provisions of the
FHA as protection from an unwarranted transfer, a protection the
Act is not clearly designed to provide.
V. CONCLUSION
This detailed hypothetical is an example of what happens
within an industry that is reputable, for the most part, and yet lacks
appropriate oversight.  CCRCs in general strive to provide a high
quality of life and the assurance that whatever challenges senior
citizens might face, they have a community that will care for them
for many years to come. The CCRC examined here did not show
such care.  It made a unilateral decision rather than fully consult-
ing with the resident and any other appropriate individual.  It re-
fused to see that the complainant was an elderly person with a
disability who could direct and fund her needs so as to live indepen-
dently.  Respondent’s decision would have swiftly decreased the
complainant’s health and quality of life, given her disability.  How-
ever, judicial intervention could make new law that would affect
the whole CCRC industry, causing unintended consequences.
Swift leadership in rulemaking should be taken so that the elderly
in specialized housing and the housing providers know what, if
any, their rights and responsibilities are under the Federal Fair
Housing Act.
88 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4608 (McKinney 2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. §52:27D-330
(West 2003); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY § 1788 (a)(10)(A)(i-iv) (West Supp. 2003).
